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1. INTRODUCTION
EXISTING scholarly literature generally either ignores or disparages the influence thatmass public opinion has on contemporary US trade policy. Even when scholars have
analysed public opinion’s impact on US foreign policy, they have ignored trade policy (Nacos
et al., 2000; Holsti, 2004). Because trade policy is rarely voters’ highest priority, it is assumed
that political actors face few electoral consequences for defying public opinion and thus have
a relatively free hand to implement trade policy without regard for mass public opinion. As
this paper demonstrates, even though trade is generally not voters’ highest priority, political
actors still face consequences for being on the wrong side of public opinion on trade. These
consequences guide trade policy by channelling the political competition between the parties
over that policy.
Within the literature on trade politics, early works depicted trade policy as driven by more
concentrated interests rather than the general public (Schattschneider, 1935). This depiction
continues to be the conventional wisdom. For example, Guisinger (2009) found that trade
issues are generally low in salience and segued from that finding into the argument that this
low salience means that the general public’s preferences are a poor predictor of trade policy.
Destler’s (2005) account of US trade policy also generally ignores public opinion in favour of
narrower interests and institutional dynamics. Shoch (2001) too passes over public opinion in
favour of four other factors in explaining how party competition influences trade policy: the
President’s preference, the preferences and cohesion of the party caucuses, the willingness of
Congress and the President to compromise, and whether control of the government is divided
or unified. While there is considerable merit in these scholars’ explanations of US trade policy
formulation, those explanations can be supplemented if the distribution of public opinion and
its guidance of political party competition are more fully taken into account.
My argument rests on a few assumptions. First, political actors want to remain in power.
Second, political actors tend to value staying in power more than they value holding to a
given policy position. Political actors who defy public opinion are celebrated as courageous
and are rare, precisely because those who accept unpopularity and defeat rather than change
their positions are the exception rather than the rule. Third, the primary ways an individual
may lose power are to lose the backing of key supporters, to be viewed as out of step with
public opinion, or to be seen as incompetent. Given these assumptions, with regard to trade
policy, we should expect political actors to attempt to accomplish the following: (i) maintain
the support of their party’s leadership; (ii) maintain the support of their core constituents and
(iii) be perceived as in agreement with the majority of the public. Given these incentives, we
should expect to see political actors’ behaviour be highly contingent on public opinion. The
upshot of this is that political actors and their parties may be able to derive an electoral
advantage from politically effective trade policies but that advantage is contingent upon the
configuration of public opinion on trade policy. Thus, I contend that mass public opinion
influences US trade policy by shaping how the two parties compete over trade.
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Mass public opinion configurations on trade can be classified into three basic categories
based on whether public opinion is balanced or unbalanced, and if it is balanced, whether the
division is primarily along partisan lines or not. If mass public opinion is unbalanced (i.e. if it
is strongly more in favour of one policy direction than another), there is a strong incentive for
each party to attempt to win over the large block of voters that sits at one end of the prefer-
ence spectrum. If significantly more voters are strongly in favour of a policy than are neutral
or opposed, the electoral logic is unambiguous. More votes can be gained by advocating the
popular position. Furthermore, each party has a strong incentive to persuade the public that its
policy position is not only good, but also that its position is better than the position advanced
by the other party. There is much to be gained electorally if the other party can be cast as
insufficiently in favour of that policy. These two facets, the unbalanced nature of public opin-
ion and the incentive to differentiate one’s own party from the opposition, mean that we
should expect the two parties to enter into a bidding war in which each party tries to be the
most in favour of that popular policy.
If public opinion is balanced (i.e. not as a whole more strongly in favour of one policy
direction than another) and the fault line is partisan (the supporters of one party are in favour
of a policy while the supporters of the other party are against it), then each party has an
incentive to hold to its position and each individual has an incentive to remain loyal to their
party. The parties cannot hope to gain more votes by switching positions than they would lose
given that the other party already represents those voters who support their new position.
Each individual has little incentive to defy their party’s leadership if there is a reasonable
expectation that the vast majority of their party colleagues will not break ranks. The benefit
of breaking ranks will need to be extremely high to justify the cost of being seen as a party
turncoat.
Because each side believes its position is best, it will want to gain credit for promoting that
good policy. That credit becomes diluted, however, if a large proportion of the other party
can claim that it too promoted the legislation. Therefore, for the majority party, it actually
pays to craft the policy in a way that reduces the opposition’s support for it. The opposition
meanwhile believes that the policy is bad and thus will be unpopular. It therefore has an
incentive to ensure that none of its members become tainted by supporting that policy. The
opposition also gains by robbing the majority’s proposal of the legitimacy that accrues from it
being seen as bipartisan.
Each party’s determination to present a unified front unifies the other party. The majority
party, seeing its opposition united, has little hope of gaining support from them and so must
rely on keeping its members in line. The opposition, seeing a unified majority that seems
uninterested in offering real compromises, becomes that much more cohesive in its opposi-
tion. Regardless of which party starts the polarisation process, the partisan split in public
opinion undermines concessions and creates an acrimonious spiral. Thus, in this scenario, we
should expect policymaking to devolve into a Manichean conflict with the winner determined
by which of the two parties most effectively creates unity in its party and division in its
opponent.
Of the three potential public opinion configurations, a non-partisan split presents legislators
and the President with the least onerous political constraints because it allows for a greater
number of politically safe alternative strategies. This is a double-edged sword though. While
it does mean that the politician has more potential strategies, it also means that they receive
significantly less information about which strategy is politically safest. If public opinion is
balanced and is non-partisan in its split, then many of the normal signals that indicate to a
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political actor which is the safest policy to support do not operate. The balanced nature of
public opinion means that the political actor does not receive an unambiguous signal about
which policy direction is widely preferred. Meanwhile, the non-partisan nature of the split
means that the individual does not have a clear idea of which direction their colleagues will
go and dilutes the damage of voting against the wishes of the party’s leadership, especially if
the leadership itself is split. The only threat to that individual’s political survival then comes
from the constituency level. If the national level signals are ambiguous while the constituency
level signals are clear, the individual legislator will likely follow their constituency’s prefer-
ences (Table 1).
To examine the relationship between mass public opinion and US trade policy, I employ a
comparative case study method. As George and Bennett (2005) have argued, case studies
help complement statistical approaches because the two methods have different strengths.
Case studies achieve a high level of conceptual validity, are ideal for exploring new
hypotheses and assist the researcher in examining causal pathways (George and Bennett,
2005). These strengths mean that case studies can be particularly helpful in addressing the
influence mass public opinion, through its channelling of party competition, has on trade
policy.
Employing a case study method means that I am able to avoid engaging in conceptual
stretching. Were I to employ statistical methods, many of the cases would be unclear in terms
of which distribution they resembled and so would not be particularly helpful in examining
what effect public opinion has on party competition in trade policy. The cases that I have
chosen help explore this relationship precisely because they represent archetypes of the differ-
ing public opinion distributions. Public opinion was unbalanced on how to respond to Tianan-
men Square in 1989–90, balanced and non-partisan on NAFTA ratification in 1992–93, and
balanced and partisan on trade promotion authority in 2001–02.
2. THE RACE TO SANCTION CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN SQUARE
After the Tiananmen Square protests and subsequent repression, public opinion strongly
favoured doing something to signal American indignation. Congressional Democrats and
Republicans engaged in a bidding war over who could levy the heaviest sanctions on China
and thus demonstrate that they were more thoroughly outraged and more supportive of
Chinese protesters. Meanwhile, President Bush demonstrated little desire to engage in this
bidding process but found his policy options constrained by the Congressional bidding war
nonetheless.
As a non-market economy and a state that does not allow free emigration, China’s
most favoured nation status had to be renewed annually by Presidential waiver per the
TABLE 1
Division and Distribution of Public Opinion and Party Competition in Trade Policy
Distribution Division
Inter-party Intra-party
Balanced Manichean conflict Local considerations prevail
Unbalanced Bidding war
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Jackson-Vanik amendment to the 1974 Trade Act; China first received this waiver in 1980
(Skidmore and Gates, 1997). From 1980 to 1989, China was granted most favoured nation
status by presidential waiver un-controversially (Destler, 2005). The public’s views on China
were largely positive at this time; in February 1989, 72 per cent of respondents held very or
mostly favourable opinions of China (Gallup, 1989). In April 1989, the Tiananmen Square
protests began. By the middle of May, American media outlets were closely covering the pro-
tests. Americans were generally aware of the protests and subsequent massacre. Seventy-nine
per cent reported following the events very or somewhat closely (ABC News/Washington Post
1989a).
The Tiananmen Square crackdown significantly altered Americans’ views on China. In
contrast to the positive views reported in February, in June only 16 per cent held favourable
opinions of China, while 28 per cent held a somewhat unfavourable view, and 50 per cent
held a very unfavourable view (Los Angeles Times 1989). With respect to what would consti-
tute an appropriate policy, public opinion overwhelmingly favoured the American government
doing something to signal disapproval of the Chinese government’s human rights abuses.
Sixty-seven per cent believed that the United States should issue a strong protest even if it set
back US–China relations (Harris Survey, 1989). Seventy-five per cent favoured suspending
arms sales and 60 per cent favoured restricting American investment in China (Gallup, 1989a,
1989b). Thirty-seven per cent even supported a complete ban on US trade with China (ABC
News/Washington Post, 1989b). The outrage was similar among liberals and conservatives
and particularly strong among the attentive public (Suettinger, 2003). American public opinion
on this issue was clearly unbalanced.
Democrats were the first to push for greater sanctions but were quickly followed by Con-
gressional Republicans; a reluctant President Bush was dragged along by the Congressional
bidding war. In the massacre’s immediate aftermath, Democratic congressmen such as Alan
Cranston, Stephen Solarz, Sam Nunn and Claiborne Pell advocated a range of extensive sanc-
tions (Hoffman and Dewar, 1989). Not to be outdone, Republicans such as Jesse Helms pro-
posed revoking China’s most favoured nation status and denying China access to
technologically sophisticated American exports (Riddell, 1989).
Strategic considerations, a sense that he knew China better than Congress given his experi-
ence there in 1974–75, a concern for institutional prerogative and a preference for realist for-
eign policy motivated President Bush to pursue a much more moderate policy towards China
than that preferred by the Congressional party delegations (Suettinger, 2003). Nevertheless, on
5 June, President Bush suspended arms sales to China although rejected broader trade sanc-
tions (Weinraub, 1989). Without Congressional pressure, President Bush may not have even
done that. His administration viewed the push for sanctions as a reckless temper tantrum. His
trade representative Carla Hills argued that the arms sales suspension was necessary because
‘clearly when you have death, violence, killing going on, it takes centre stage and quiet, sensi-
ble discussions on trade have to take second stage’ while another Bush administration official
stated that a major impetus behind the arms sale suspension was ‘so we [the Bush Adminis-
tration] wouldn’t seem to be dragged along by the Hill’ (Hoffman and Dewar, 1989).1 The
President argued that engagement would yield greater reform than sanctions.
Democrats quickly deemed the suspension of arms sales insufficient and brought forth new
efforts to display outrage at Beijing. John Glenn led a charge to block a US–China nuclear
1 Emphasis mine.
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energy deal (Walker, 1989). Tom Lantos, along with 51 co-sponsors, introduced a bill revok-
ing China’s most favoured nation status (House of Representatives (HR) 2613, 1989–1990).
House Speaker Foley began publicly advocating expanded sanctions and criticised the Presi-
dent for being insufficiently strident in his condemnation of the Chinese government (Fried-
man, 1989a). In a meeting with a congressional committee, Secretary of State Baker
mistakenly promised that the Bush Administration would suspend high-level intergovernmen-
tal meetings. The White House did not want to make this promise but once it had been made,
the administration felt that it had to stick to it (Sutter 1998). Baker also promised that the
administration would try to delay China’s loan applications that were under review at the
World Bank and IMF (Friedman, 1989b).
Democrats quickly outbid these measures. Senate Majority Leader Mitchell accused the
President of being out of step with public opinion and of refusing ‘to give outlet to the feel-
ings of the American people’ (Friedman, 1989c). Meanwhile, Democrats and Republicans in
the House of Representatives engaged in a furious competition over who could add the most
stringent anti-China amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Bill and thus claim the
mantle of most ardent supporters of democracy. Proposed amendments included: ending all
high-tech exports (Levine-D), prohibiting exports of controlled munitions (Gilman-R),
prohibiting the issuance of new risk insurance policies for companies doing business in China
(Weiss-D) and prohibiting export licences for satellites (Solomon-R) (Friedman, 1989c; HR
1487, 1989–1990). The House voted in favour of the bill containing these amendments by a
whopping 418–0 (Tolchin, 1989). The Senate passed a similar version 81–10 (Suettinger,
2003). The bill barred the President from resuming arms sales or high-level meetings unless it
was in the national security interest or China made progress on human rights (Tolchin, 1989).
During this process, President Bush worked to block legislation revoking China’s most
favoured nation status and to add carve-outs that would provide greater executive flexibility
in implementing sanctions (Skidmore and Gates, 1997). He then used these exceptions to
allow the sale of Boeing jets to the Chinese government (Sutter 1998). Simultaneously, he
sent Brent Scowcroft and Thomas Eagleburger on a secret trip to Beijing to maintain US–
China relations (Suettinger, 2003). These exceptions notwithstanding, the sanctions con-
strained US–China relations in ways that President Bush would not have pursued on his own.
The propensity of congressmen to not just support, but also claim credit for being the most
in defence of Chinese dissidents was exemplified by the fact that over half of the House of
Representatives, including high-profile members from both parties, chose not just to support
but to co-sponsor a bill that would allow Chinese students in America to remain in the United
States past their visas (HR 2712, 101st Congress, 1989; Suettinger, 2003). Once the bill
became known as the Pelosi bill after its original sponsor, Republicans made sure that they
would receive partial credit for the bill stating that on this issue, there were ‘an awful lot of
conservatives who feel as strongly as Nancy Pelosi’ (Skidmore and Gates, 1997, p. 526). The
measure passed the House and the Senate unanimously (Suettinger, 2003).
Seemingly, everyone supported the bill except President Bush. He opposed it because it
denied what he saw as the executive’s rightful primacy in foreign policy and because he
thought it would damage the US–China relationship by humiliating the Chinese government
(Skidmore and Gates, 1997; Suettinger, 2003). He therefore vetoed the bill and shortly there-
after announced that he would use an executive order to extend the same protections to Chi-
nese students in America (Executive Order 12711, 1990). It was not his preferred policy but
was inevitable and having it be an executive order at least allowed him to preserve his institu-
tional prerogative and blunt the criticism that he was advancing a callous foreign policy.
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This case suggests several lessons. First, while Congressional Republicans and Democrats
were eager to engage in a bidding war over who could be the most anti-Beijing, President
Bush was not willing to participate in this. He was less sensitive to public opinion than
Congress. He needed to actually manage US foreign policy and thus wanted to maintain good
relations with China for geopolitical reasons regardless of China’s human rights record. He
believed in a realist foreign policy that placed a premium on promoting America’s strategic
interests over normative concerns and thought sanctions would accomplish little and may even
be counterproductive (Dueck, 2010). He was not facing re-election for three years and could
assume that the issue’s salience would ebb by then. In any case, the Soviet Union was col-
lapsing; foreign policy did not appear to be hurting his approval rating. Bush’s approach
shows that party competition logic will not override all other considerations for all political
actors at all times.
On the other hand, Congress’s bidding war consistently constrained the President. Without
it, the suspension of arms sales to China (which is still in place today) may never have hap-
pened at all. Another lasting impact was that human rights became a consistent sticking point
in opening trade with China. Permanent normal trade relations with China were granted only
after human rights monitoring provisions were established (Destler, 2005). It was at a Con-
gressional hearing that policy mis-coordination led James Baker to promise an end to high-
level intergovernmental meetings. This promise, and the perception of duplicity that breaking
it created, generated a firestorm of criticism in December 1989 when it was revealed that
Scowcroft and Eagleburger had been sent on their visit less than a month after the crack-
down.
The bidding war also meant that President Bush was forced to establish benchmarks for
policy success that he did not want. President Bush understood that attempting to sell the
American people a realist foreign policy was a political non-starter because it would be
rejected as callous and amoral. He had to argue that his approach was a better means of pro-
moting democracy in China (Skidmore and Gates, 1997). Later, when the Chinese government
had made no progress on this front, Bush’s China policy was deemed a failure. But it was
only deemed as such because it was judged on goals that it was not actually designed to
achieve. This criterion only came about because of the Congressional bidding war. President
Bush may not have been a willing participant in the bidding war, but it still dragged him in
its direction. That it could change the policies pursued by an institutionally independent,
reluctant, powerful, popular political actor demonstrates just how strong the outbidding vortex
can be.
One potential alternative explanation is that Congress already wanted to curtail trade with
China and Tiananmen Square simply gave them the excuse. That argument is unsatisfactory.
As Destler (2005) points out, in 1989, trade was not high on the legislative agenda, the US
trade deficit was shrinking, and Speaker Jim Wright was replaced by Tom Foley who was a
much stronger free trade advocate.
Another alternative explanation is that the US response was not a product of public opinion
and that even if public opinion had been different, the US response would have been the
same. But this too is unconvincing. Let us suppose that conservatives agreed with President
Bush’s inclination that as unfortunate as the Tiananmen Square massacre was, punishing
China would be bad policy. This would have meant that the underlying public opinion was a
balanced partisan split. Under that condition, we should expect a Manichean deadlock. There
was actually an event on this issue over which opinion was divided along party lines and that
division did produce just such a deadlock. After the President vetoed the Pelosi Bill but
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replaced it with an executive order, Democrats fiercely criticised the President and pushed for
a veto override (Xie, 2008). The vehemence of Democratic criticism despite the fact that stu-
dent protection had been implemented anyway convinced Republicans that the veto override
proposal was what Minority Whip Simpson called a ‘trash-the President’ move by Democrats;
Republicans stood opposed to the motion and so it did not pass (Dewar, 1990). Had the larger
debate on sanctions resembled this kind of balanced partisan split, it is likely that President
Bush would have found it easier to do what he preferred, condemn the crackdown rhetorically
but do nothing that would undermine the US–China relationship.
Finally, what if it the public opinion distribution had been a balanced non-partisan split?
There is not an event on this particular issue that fits that description but the debate over
NAFTA a few years later did have this kind of underlying public opinion and thus may offer
some clues as to how that kind of distribution may have affected the US response to Tianan-
men Square.
3. LOCAL PREFERENCES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE – THE DEBATE OVER NAFTA
RATIFICATION
With regard to ratifying NAFTA, President Clinton, House Republicans and House Demo-
crats all received ambiguous signals from public opinion and from their own parties. Each of
them faced little fear of being on the wrong side of public opinion or of being perceived as a
party turncoat. That meant that the greatest threat to their continuation in government
emanated from the possibility that they would lose the support of constituencies that had
supported them in the previous election. Thus, the President and individual legislators
attempting to defend the interests of those constituencies defined the political competition
surrounding NAFTA ratification.
In 1992, with the economy stagnating and NAFTA negotiations accelerating, the issue
became part of the presidential election campaign.2 NAFTA underscored and crystalised the
increasing extent of international trade in the public mind. As Thomas Donahue of the AFL-
CIO put it, ‘GATT is something nobody understands and NAFTA is something everybody
understands’ (Aaronson, 2001, p. 139). Clinton was thus faced with a high-profile issue that
he had to respond to but received no clear signals from broader public opinion or his party as
to which position was the most prudent.
Public opinion was split and non-partisan on the issue. In a poll taken in September 1992,
27 per cent favoured NAFTA, 34 per cent were opposed, and 40 per cent were either unde-
cided or had not heard enough about it (NBC News/Wall Street Journal, 1992a). Other polls
showed similar results (Gallup/Newsweek, 1992; NBC News/Wall Street Journal, 1992b).
Thus, general public opinion did not demonstrate which policy position would reap greater
electoral benefits. Furthermore, even within the Democratic Party, opinion was split. When
asked whether their party should support or oppose NAFTA, 40 per cent of Democrats
favoured supporting it while 41 per cent opposed it (ABC News/Washington Post, 1992).
Generally, Democrats who were college-educated, white-collar and/or suburban were more
likely to favour NAFTA, whereas Democrats who were not college-educated, blue-collar and/
or urban were more likely to oppose NAFTA (Shoch, 2001).
2 By September, over 50 per cent of Americans had read or heard about NAFTA (Gallup, 1992) and 40
per cent were following the issue very or somewhat closely (News Interest 1992).
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Candidate Clinton’s strategy was to give something to both sides and so he endorsed
NAFTA while also criticising it as inadequate on environmental protection, labour standards
and import spikes, and demanded side agreements on these issues. In the short term, this
helped Clinton satisfy both wings of his party but it left a lingering confusion as to whether
he actually favoured the agreement.3
That lingering confusion was fed by the opaqueness of Clinton’s NAFTA stance during the
first months of his presidency. His trade representative, Mickey Kantor, was not identified
with either trade liberalisation or protectionism (Destler, 2005). Clinton was determined to
satisfy both constituencies that elected him (college-educated, white-collar Democrats and
non-college, blue-collar Democrats). A resolution that satisfied both groups promised to make
ratification easier. Indeed, of those who said they opposed NAFTA, 40 per cent said they
would favour it if they deemed the side agreements adequate (Time/CNN/Yankelovich Part-
ners, 1993). Attempting to thread the needle on the side agreements was understandable in
theory but led to the Clinton Administration taking no real position at all in practice. Nuance
devolved into confusion. Kantor and Secretary of Labor Reich argued for a hardline approach
on the side agreements, whereas Treasury, State Department and National Economic Council
officials pushed for weaker side agreements (Shoch, 2001).
The problem was that Clinton allowed this internal dispute to take place in public, creating
an impression of division, sloppiness and confusion within the Administration (Destler, 2005).
Compounding this, Clinton’s propensity for revisiting previously decided issues meant that his
staff frequently treated policy matters as still negotiable even after he had made a decision
(Destler, 2005). Clinton’s lack of clarity to this point was exemplified by the fact that 52 per
cent of Americans still did not know what position he held on NAFTA and another 19 per
cent believed he had no position at all (CBS News/New York Times, 1993).
To make matters worse, the Clinton Administration seemed incapable of sticking to a posi-
tion if that position garnered opposition. In May, the White House rescinded its relatively
weak initial offer and called for including trade sanctions as an enforcement mechanism after
some Democrats expressed a desire for tougher provisions (McParland 1993). Significantly,
this more stringent position was still not enough to satisfy labour organisations (Shoch,
2001).4 When Republicans began withdrawing their support, Clinton again shifted to a more
flexible position (Sands, 1993). If a tough negotiating position was going to lose Clinton
Republican support but still not acquire labour’s support, then a weaker position that at least
would gain the support of one of those groups was the strategically superior choice.5 Thus,
Clinton announced his unambiguous support for NAFTA and its weakened side agreements.
The public opinion and party signals that Republicans received were also mixed. Twenty
per cent of respondents said that their Congressman supporting NAFTA would make them
less likely to vote for them while 20 per cent said that it would make them more likely but
53 per cent said that it would make no difference (ABC News, 1993).6 The vast majority of
3 NAFTA was signed in December 1992, after the election but before Clinton took office. It had to be
ratified by the end of 1993. Given that the Senate overrepresented export-oriented agricultural states,
NAFTA’s most difficult hurdle would be in the House of Representatives (Shoch, 2000).
4 Many but not all environmental groups were pleased with the new tougher policies and so endorsed
NAFTA (Audley, 1997; Destler, 2005).
5 This approach had the added bonus of burnishing his reputation as a centrist New Democrat, a reputa-
tion that had been bruised during the fight over the federal budget earlier in the year.
6 A second poll asking that question had 60 per cent say no effect (Gallup/CNN/USA Today, 1993).
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Americans did not know what their representative’s position was (CBS News/New York
Times, 1993). Also, while most Republicans supported free trade, there were enough Republi-
can voices such as Pat Buchanan advocating economic nationalism that a Republican Con-
gressman could oppose NAFTA without being branded a party turncoat (Mayer, 1998).
Not only did Republicans receive no clear signal from the public or from within the party
during the spring and summer of 1993 they also received no consistent signals from the White
House. Had there been an unbalanced or partisan split public opinion distribution, Republi-
cans would have known which course was the safest for them. Without these signals, the
President’s intentions became a crucial piece of information. Republicans were unwilling to
push for ratification without help from the President. Without clear signals from constituents
or the President, most congressmen had no choice but to wait for more information about
which policy position was in their best interest. Thus, only 72 congressmen declared a posi-
tion on NAFTA in 1992 or the first eight months of 1993, whereas 159 declared in Septem-
ber, 55 did so in October, and 149 decided in November (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 1997).
Clinton’s decision to fully support ratification finally gave them the signal they needed.
Although this signal was not mixed in itself, it had ambivalent implications. On the one hand,
many Republicans were reluctant to sign on to an agreement that could be construed as a vic-
tory for Clinton (Merida and Cooper, 1993). On the other hand, Republicans had largely sup-
ported NAFTA while George H.W. Bush was President and so this presented them with an
opportunity to achieve their preferred policy. Republicans also liked that NAFTA was driving
a wedge into the Democratic coalition (Destler, 2005).
Still, the ambiguous public opinion and party signals meant legislators were often best
served by supporting constituencies that helped them get elected in the first place. It was for
this reason that Republican support for NAFTA broke down along regional lines. Representa-
tives from high-tech, white-collar districts or export-oriented agricultural districts, especially
in the South and the West, and who received more campaign contributions from business sup-
ported NAFTA, whereas Republicans who opposed NAFTA predominantly hailed from blue-
collar industrial districts, especially in the Midwest and Northeast (Shoch, 2001).
In addition to the same ambiguous public opinion signals faced by the President and House
Republicans, House Democrats also had a split party leadership. While President Clinton sup-
ported NAFTA, House Majority Leader Gephardt and Majority Whip Bonior were NAFTA’s
principal opponents (Lee, 1993). Given this set of circumstances, House Democrats’ support
for NAFTA also broke along regional and constituency lines. Similar to the Republicans,
Democrats who represented white-collar or export-oriented agricultural districts, especially in
the South and West, were more likely to support the agreement, whereas those who repre-
sented blue-collar, urban or industrial districts, especially in the Midwest and Northeast, or
who received major campaign contributions from labour were more likely to oppose NAFTA
(Shoch, 2001).
These disparate regional interests allowed President Clinton to make side deals to win sup-
port for NAFTA. One important side deal was the implementation of a triple transformation
test, which amounted to greater protection for textiles. This was a major factor in gaining the
support of congressmen from textile-producing states (Destler, 2005). Another was the cre-
ation of a North American Development Bank which won the support of the Congressman
who came up with idea and solidified the support of Hispanic and environmental organisations
(Mayer, 1998). A third involved increasing protection for citrus and sugar farmers to win the
support of representatives from Florida (Garrett, 1993). President Clinton promised to protect
the interests of tomato and peanut growers as well (Avery, 1998). These side deals helped
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secure NAFTA ratification in the House of Representatives by a margin of 234–200 (HR
3450. 103rd Congress). One hundred and thirty-two Republicans and 102 Democrats sup-
ported it while 43 Republicans and 156 Democrats opposed it (Shoch, 2001).
The primary alternative hypothesis to this argument is that regional and sectoral interests
led to the weakness of party alignment rather than the other way around. This argument has
been advanced by Thorbecke (1997). His quantitative analysis shows that the presence of
these differing interests was correlated with congressmen’s votes on NAFTA (Thorbecke,
1997). This argument, however, gets the causal mechanism backwards. Rather than causing
party weakness, the correlation of representatives’ votes with these interests was facilitated by
the fact that public opinion on NAFTA was divided evenly and in a non-partisan way. If
Thorbecke’s argument were correct, then we should have seen a weak party effect in other
trade policies where these differing interests were present such as the 1988 Trade Bill or Pres-
ident George W. Bush’s pursuit of trade promotion authority in his first term. Instead, the
party effect in the voting behaviour on those pieces of trade legislation was strong despite dif-
fering regional interests (Shoch, 2001).
This case suggests several lessons. First, a non-partisan split in public opinion reduces the
bargaining power of individual interests within a party. Had Republicans been uniformly
opposed to NAFTA, the bargaining position of organised labour would have been much stron-
ger. President Clinton would have been forced to either give labour whatever concessions it
wanted or accept the defeat of NAFTA. Instead, the existence of potential Republican support
meant that President Clinton, upon determining that acquiring labour’s support was all but
impossible, had another source of potential support. Furthermore, once labour support could
not be had, Clinton benefited from criticising labour because that reduced Republicans’ con-
cern that NAFTA ratification would be perceived as an unalloyed victory for the Democrats.
Second, under a non-partisan balanced split, special interests increase their bargaining
power by remaining uncommitted. President Clinton could spurn labour without facing any
real electoral threat. Given the antipathy between labour and the Republicans, labour threaten-
ing to support Republicans would not have been credible. Labour may still have been able to
maintain a strong bargaining position if it had left open the possibility of supporting the
President’s push to ratify NAFTA. Intransigence to even the toughest proposals made by the
Clinton Administration squandered that. Once it became clear that there was no chance of
securing labour’s support, labour was marginalised. Moderate environmentalist groups provide
a good counter-example. By making it clear that their support could be won at a high but not
impossibly high policy cost, moderate environmentalist groups were able to increase the
extent to which the side agreements reflected their preferences (Audley, 1997; Avery, 1998;
Mayer, 1998). The lesson for special interests is that being intransigent without being the dif-
ference between success and failure is a recipe for being excluded from the policymaking pro-
cess altogether.
4. THE VERY PARTISAN BIPARTISAN TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY OF 2001
In 2001, President Bush asked for fast-track authority to pursue another round of WTO
negotiations, a Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement, and bilateral trade deals with Sin-
gapore and Chile. The public opinion distribution on the appropriateness of granting such
authority was balanced but partisan. Fourteen per cent of Americans strongly favoured grant-
ing it, 32 per cent favoured it, 32 per cent were opposed, and 14 per cent were strongly
opposed (Pew Research Center for the People, 2001). While Republicans were in favour by a
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margin of 63–32 per cent (+31), Democrats were opposed by a margin of 56–39 per cent
(17), meaning that there was a 48-point spread between the two parties’ positions (Pew
Research Center, 2001).
There was also a partisan split on the major sticking point in the negotiation (the extent to
which fast-track authority should include labour and environmental provisions). Republicans
were twice as likely to say that encouraging economic growth was more important than pro-
tecting the environment, while Democrats were more likely to say the opposite (ABC News/
Washington Post, 2001).7 Republicans were also twice as likely as Democrats to have very
little or no confidence in organised labour (Gallup/CNN/USA Today, 2001).
Given this public opinion distribution, it would make sense for Republicans to try to pass
trade promotion authority without labour and environment provisions if they could. However,
given that over 50 Republicans had voted against every trade liberalisation bill since NAFTA,
the Bush Administration would need some Democratic help (Destler, 2005). A compromise
seemed necessary, but the two parties saw themselves as so far apart that no proposal seemed
to satisfy both parties. Senator Grassley said that the difficulty with ‘Democrats’ solutions on
labor and environmental issues [was] that for every Democratic vote it picks up, you lose one
Republican vote’ (Allen and Goldstein, 2001).
On 13 June 2001, House Republicans introduced HR 2149, which would grant President
Bush fast-track authority but did not include any environmental or labour provisions whatso-
ever (HR 2149. 107th Congress). House Democrats reacted angrily. Richard Gephardt encap-
sulated Democrat’s feeling, calling the bill Republicans’ ‘my way or the highway’ solution
(Sek, 2003, p. 5). Bill Thomas, the Republican who chaired the Ways and Means Committee,
made it clear that he hoped to make the minimum amount of concessions necessary to acquire
whatever few Democrats’ support would be required to pass the bill (Destler, 2005). As part
of this strategy, Thomas sidestepped the senior Democrats on the Ways and Means Commit-
tee (Rangel, Matsui, and Levin) and instead worked with three more junior Democrats known
to be free trade advocates (Destler, 2005). When Democrat Carl Levin approached Thomas to
try to broker a compromise, Thomas rejected his overture saying, ‘I consider you part of the
enemy on this issue’ (Destler, 2005, p. 292). To make matters worse, the Bush Administration
used 9/11 to connect national security and trade, implying that Democratic opposition to trade
promotion authority on Republican terms was tantamount to a lack of patriotism (Kahn,
2001a). This of course outraged Democrats, making them even less willing to compromise,
although it did rally support from some of the Republicans who had opposed trade liberalisa-
tion earlier.
In late September, Thomas released a summary of a compromise plan; the Democrats
deemed the measures insufficient but made a counter-offer (Washington Post, 2001). The
Republicans ignored this counter-offer and introduced HR 3005 modelled on Thomas’s plan.
Democrats res‘ponded with their own bill, HR 3019. After rancorous negotiation sessions
brought the two sides no closer together, the Republican bill was approved and the Demo-
cratic bill rejected along party line votes (Destler, 2005). In November, Charlie Rangel sent
the Republican leadership a document outlining what would be needed for the trade promo-
tion act to gain Democratic support; as Destler points out, three of the four issues should
have presented little problem to the Republicans, but the fourth entailed a possible future
toughening of labour regulations in the United States which Republicans considered
7 Republicans: 64–32 split. Democrats: 37–59 split.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
PUBLIC OPINION AND US TRADE POLICY 11
anathema (Destler, 2005). The Republican leadership chose to not give Rangel the dignity
of a response (Destler, 2005). Democrats became so angry at the naked way in which they
had been marginalised that even those who normally supported trade liberalisation withdrew
their support (Kahn, 2001b). Democrats also believed that a new free trade deal would be
unpopular and so they might be able to use that to their advantage in the 2002 mid-term
elections (Shoch, 2001). Given the 9/11 attacks, if they were going to criticise President
Bush, it had to be on economic issues.
For their part, some Congressional Republican leaders such as Tom DeLay were not just
willing but eager to make the vote as partisan as possible because they believed it would
be popular with big business and hoped to win greater support from corporate donors (Des-
tler, 2005). A combination of arm-twisting, procedural manipulation and concessions
brought recalcitrant Republicans on board. Efforts to win every last Republican vote were
so relentless and so successful that nearly a dozen hard-core protectionists who had even
voted to remove the United States from the WTO the previous year were convinced to vote
for the trade promotion authority legislation (Destler, 2005). The final vote on the not-so-
appropriately titled Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 was 215 in favour
and 214 against; it was the most partisan vote on a trade bill in seven decades (Destler,
2005).
Once the bill moved to the Senate, action on it became somewhat less rancorous. The Sen-
ate is more supportive of trade liberalisation than the House due to its composition and so
there was less worry that the bill could not get adequate support. Even so, the partisan politics
of the House bill meant that Senate Democrats were unwilling to get nothing in exchange for
their support. Their colleagues in the House might have been powerless to extract concessions
but the threat of the filibuster meant that Republicans had no hope of passing the bill entirely
on their own. In exchange for their support, Senate Democrats wanted the legislation to
include trade adjustment assistance, which would provide healthcare to workers who had lost
their jobs as a result of trade. Senate Republicans disliked this provision and some even
argued that passing no trade promotion authority was preferable to including healthcare provi-
sion (Destler, 2005). Most Republicans in the Senate as well as the Bush Administration dis-
agreed, accepting healthcare benefits as the price of trade promotion. The bill passed the
Senate, 66–30.8
This case demonstrates a few points. First, a partisan split distribution may decrease the
power of the opposition party to constrain the majority party in institutions such as the House
of Representatives where a simple majority is usually all that is required to advance legisla-
tion, but it still constrains the majority party in other ways. It makes the margin for error
exceedingly tight which increases the bargaining power of members in the majority party who
are willing to play the spoiler. Protectionist concessions on steel and textiles as well as greater
subsidies for agriculture were needed to win the support of some Republicans (Destler, 2005).
It also delayed fast-track authority. President Bush wanted it no later than November 2001 to
strengthen his bargaining position at the opening of the Doha Round trade negotiations (Allen
and Goldstein, 2001). He did not receive it until the following August, nearly a full year
later.
8 Final passage of a conference bill was delayed further by what can only be described as a childish par-
tisan squabble over such petty matters as whose turn it was to chair a conference; Destler (2005, p. 297)
refers to this episode as ‘a bizarre endgame that served as a poster child for interparty and interchamber
distrust’.
© 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
12 G. WINSLETT
Second, each party was at its most intransigent when it perceived itself as not needing the
other. Republicans felt that given their House majority, there was no need to compromise with
Democrats in that chamber. Democrats for their part assumed that Republicans would not be
able to find enough votes and would have to come back to the bargaining table with a better
offer.
Third, this case shows how necessary it is that some portion of the opposition be willing to
compromise. Even with a House majority, control of the Presidency, a Senate broadly in
favour of trade liberalisation, and an almost totally unified party, approval of trade promotion
authority would not have been possible without some Democratic support in both the House
and the Senate. The institutional design of Congress means that in the vast majority of cases,
for significant legislation to be enacted, some part of the minority has to be willing to
exchange its support for being allowed to make small changes to the legislation. This suggests
then that the relative division within the two parties often determines the odds of enacting
major legislation; gridlock is most likely when the opposition is more unified than the
majority.
5. DISCUSSION
The argument advanced in this paper generalises well to other events in US trade policy-
making. In September 1985, the Reagan administration moved its trade policies in a more
protectionist direction by bringing forward Section 301 cases against Japan (Shoch, 2001).
Why would a Republican Administration committed to trade liberalisation do that? They did
that because the Democrats were gaining an electoral advantage on trade by presenting them-
selves as the party that would ‘get tough’ on allegedly unfair imports and the administration
wanted to make sure that they did not get outbid on the issue (Shoch, 2001). Why did Demo-
crats believe that trying to outbid Republicans was a political winner? Because by a more
than 2 to 1 margin Americans believed that imports from Japan did more harm than good to
the economy and favoured import taxes on Japanese products (Harris Survey, 1985; Roper
Report 85–5,1985). Unbalanced public opinion launched the bidding war that forced a free-
trading Administration to move in a protectionist direction. Two decades later, a similar pub-
lic opinion distribution prompted Congress to kill a deal that would have transferred control
of six US ports to a company from Dubai.9
The 217–215 House vote that ratified the Central American Free Trade Agreement in July
2005 was as partisan as the 2001 House vote to grant President Bush trade promotion author-
ity for many of the same reasons (Sparshott, 2005). The 237–197 vote on admitting China to
the WTO in 2000 by granting them permanent normal trade relations came with the same
kind of constituency catering that characterised the ratification of NAFTA (McGregor, 2000).
Legislators’ freedom to vote against party lines was made easier by the fact that approval of
admitting China to the WTO was split with 43 per cent of Americans in favour and 45 per
cent opposed; the approval margins among Republicans and Democrats were almost identical
(Gallup/CNN/USA Today, 2000).
9 Even when they were told that Dubai Ports World managed other ports and that those ports’ security
was managed by the Coast Guard, 82 per cent of Americans were opposed to the deal compared to only
15 per cent who approved. This preference held across party identification, age, income and education
level (ABC News/Washington Post, 2006).
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The cases selected for this analysis were chosen because they represented archetypes of the
differing public opinion distributions. Most cases, however, will not be such neat archetypes.
Still, the cases presented here point to what we should expect in mixed cases. In cases where
there is some degree of partisan split and some degree of non-partisan split, we should expect
components of the defining features that accompany these two types of underlying opinion
distribution, Manichean conflict and catering to core constituencies. And indeed, we do see a
great deal of both of those dynamics in many issues in American trade policy precisely
because public opinion on most trade issues contains some amount partisan and non-partisan
division. Likewise, in cases where public opinion is unbalanced but where there is some
non-partisan split, then we should see the parties cater to those constituencies that provide
opportunities to outbid their opposition.
One of the alternative hypotheses to the argument that public opinion drives the parties’
approaches to trade is that trade policies are driven by ideas (Goldstein, 1993; Nollen and
Quinn, 1994). The analysis presented in this paper suggests some strengths and limitations of
that assertion. On the one hand, George H.W. Bush’s realist bent, Republicans’ preference for
free trade and Democrats’ commitment to labour had efficacy. On the other hand, public opin-
ion driven party competition tempered Bush’s realism, increased the impact of Republican’s
free trade proclivities during the NAFTA debate by bringing more Democrats on board and
stiffened Democrats’ desire for labour standards and Republican opposition to such standards
being included in trade legislation by adding an electoral incentive to the ideological incentive
already present. This paper suggests a consideration whose incorporation can augment these
ideational theories.
Examining public opinion may also augment our understanding of veto players in trade
policy formulation. A greater number of veto players does inhibit trade liberalisation, and it is
often assumed that divided governments increase the number of veto players by increasing
the necessity of placating both parties (Mansfield et al., 2008). That may be the case in some
situations but as this paper has shown, if the underlying public opinion is split in a non-parti-
san way, divided government may promote trade liberalisation by creating incentives for
members of both parties to support it.
Likewise, examining public opinion also speaks to the debate about government division
and trade negotiation. Some scholars assert that divided government creates greater opportuni-
ties for trade liberalisation (Sherman, 2002). Others argue that divided government impedes
trade liberalisation (Lohmann and O’Halloran, 1994; Milner and Rosendorff, 1997). The cases
presented here show some of the conditions under which each of these may be correct.
Divided government may act as an impediment to liberalisation under partisan balanced
public opinion; one party supports the liberalisation but is blocked by the opposite party.
Conversely, divided government may promote trade liberalisation under a non-partisan split
by giving some members of each party their own reasons for supporting the legislation.
This paper also demonstrates that the importance of presidential leadership is not just rele-
vant in terms of the president being the country’s chief international negotiator but also in the
fact that he is the central figure in parties’ political competition. Presidents are not just chief
executives; they are also leaders of their parties. They are the chief targets that the opposition
hopes to weaken. Their popularity is the main asset their party must maintain to stay competi-
tive in the next election. This fact is not lost on legislators. The bidding process over who could
punish China the most stopped as soon as Republicans perceived that process to be harming
their president. During NAFTA, Republicans became less reluctant to support the bill once it
became clear that NAFTA was not going to be perceived as belonging solely to President
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Clinton, especially since it was alienating one of the Democrats’ major constituencies, organ-
ised labour. President Bush’s unwillingness to rein in House Republicans eager to marginalise
Democrats contributed to the polarisation in the debate over trade promotion authority.
Finally, this paper also contributes to our understanding of congressional involvement in
foreign policymaking. Rhode (1994) contends that congressional activism is a function of par-
tisanship, that greater partisanship beginning in the 1970s created greater congressional
assertiveness. This paper suggests one reason that may be so. Partisanship is one of the poten-
tial public opinion signals that give congressmen a clear understanding of what is in their
interests. Of the three cases examined here, Congress became very active during the first case
because it was clear what outcome would most help their party (convincing voters that they
were the more ardently supportive legislators of Chinese protesters). During the third case,
partisanship also signalled to legislators what side they should be on and helped solidify party
support among legislators who considered voting with the other party. It was during the sec-
ond case (NAFTA), especially early on, where Congress was the least active precisely
because the non-partisan nature of the public opinion split meant that congressmen did not
have adequate information about what was in their best interest until the parties’ leadership
began lobbying in favour of the bill and side deals that increased the benefit of supporting
NAFTA were negotiated.
In summation, this paper has attempted to demonstrate that, contra to the conventional wis-
dom, public opinion matters in US trade formulation by influencing how the two major parties
compete with each other over a given trade issue. Unbalanced public opinion leads to a bid-
ding war between the parties, balanced partisan splits in public opinion lead to Manichean
conflict, and balanced non-partisan splits encourage constituency catering.
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